As outlined in a UK Finance blog in April, we have seen developments in the US's dealings with Burma, Russia, Iran and, most notably, with China. However, one relationship that has not been highlighted so far is that with Cuba.

The  fractious relationship between the US and Cuba can be traced back to the 1960s - following the nationalisation policies of Fidel Castro - with the imposition of its extensive embargo programme, probably the most enduring sanctions regime of recent times. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 preserved measures by reducing Cuba's ability to trade with the US and trade in US dollars. Despite a few restrictions having been lifted over time, and the thawing of the relationship throughout the Obama administration, Cuba has remained a thorn in the side of US foreign policy.

In 2017, while criticising Obama's approach to relations, President Trump issued a National Security Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening the Policy of the US toward Cuba. In 2019, his administration enacted title III of the Helms-Burton Act, and this January it added Cuba back onto the US state sponsors of terrorism list. Three days later, for the first time ever, a Cuban individual and entity were designated under the Global Magnitsky regime.

Despite initial uncertainty surrounding the Biden administration's approach to Cuba, 200 days on we can infer a reinforcement of the approach to Cuban sanctions taken by the Trump administration in the final days of his presidency.

Protests were sparked in Cuba in July against the regime of Miguel Díaz-Canel and his party's response to Covid-19. Over the past six weeks, several Cuban individuals and entities have been designated under the Global Magnitsky regime, owing to their violent repression of the protests and wider corruption. These listings, although responses to the protests, can be viewed in tandem with the aforementioned Global Magnitsky designations made by the Trump administration in January.

The Global Magnitsky regime (CFR 583) allows the US government to sanction those, such as foreign government officials, who are implicated in human rights abuses anywhere in the world. Its usage differs from other administrations, who have made their listings under the Cuba regime (CFR 515). All Cuba listings of this year have taken place under the Global Magnitsky Act; prior to this year, no Cuban Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) had been listed under the regime despite it having been enacted in 2017.

Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) director Andrea Gacki stated in a press release that 'the Treasury Department will continue to designate'those who facilitate the Cuban regime's involvement in serious human rights abuse?. Secretary Anthony Blinken similarly commented that the US ?will continue to take action to promote accountability for the Cuban government's human rights abuses?.

While the sanctioning will likely continue owing to the breadth of the Global Magnitsky Act, these restrictions will differ greatly to those imposed on Cuba in the mid-20^th century. Although in practice SDNs would be broadly subject to the same restrictions under either regime, the use of Global Magnitsky sanctions sends the message that the US is not now sanctioning Cuba itself, but instead is  sanctioning the behaviour of certain Cuban individuals and entities.

Not only is the use of the Global Magnitsky regime a personification of the 21^st century shift from geographic to more targeted thematic sanctions, but the human rights umbrella under which the Cuba designations of 2021 are sheltered could be an attempt to provoke the US's allies into adopting similar measures. By applying this human rights angle to its listings, the US may be aiming to encourage the likes of Canada, the UK and the EU to adopt similar measures. These would be akin to those adopted in March in response to the situation in Xinjiang, as well as other examples of human rights-related coordination this year in Russia and Myanmar. Although this would involve big departures from their allies? current Cuba stances, the US will continue to sanction a regime it still views as mired in human rights abuses and corruption.